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Abstract 
 
The transformation of Paris by Haussmann (1853–1870) is presented as a classic case of state-led 
modernisation. What most accounts do not take into consideration is that Haussmann faced 
formidable opposition from property owners in his attempts to realise the emperor’s ambitions for 
Paris, an opposition that centred on competing interpretations and uses of planning law. Based on 
heretofore unstudied archival material, this paper traces Haussmann’s attempts to establish his (at 
times) creative use of planning law as legitimate in a context where planning was firmly in the 
hands of property owners. Haussmann’s strategic use of the law, or planning practice, was able to 
lay bare the fact that planning law has no legitimacy in itself – only particular uses of the law can 
gain or lose legitimacy. Planning power can thus be defined as the possession of legitimacy in the 
use of planning law. And since the legal framework is a site of contest rather than a source of 
legitimacy, planning power depends on external legitimation. In the Haussmann case it is clear that 
state backing was central, even though (implicit) early support from the Parisian population cannot 
be ruled out until more research has been conducted. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SITUATING HAUSSMANN IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARIS 
Much of the Paris of today – the wide, tree lined and monumental boulevards bordered by lines of 
uniform facades and the perspectives they create – can be traced to the work of Haussmann and 
Emperor Napoleon III during the Second Empire (1853–1870).  
 
Figure 1: An 1858 map of Paris showing the streets created (filled) and modified (hatched) since 
1851 as well as those still in the planning stage (outlined).Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, GED-933 
 
The aim of this paper is to focus specifically on the way in which Haussmann made use of planning 
law, and as such will only touch on studies that provide some traction on this issue. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that there is a vast literature on these public works. As detailed 
elsewhere1, its central strands have been biographical studies of Haussmann, French Durkheimian 
sociology2 (first applied to the transformation of Paris by Halbwachs in 1909), urban Marxist 
theory and planning history. A central concern of this literature has been to evaluate Haussmann’s 
actions. While most of the biographers and planning historians have tended towards mildly positive 
evaluations of the public works, and Durkheimian scholars have attempted to eschew evaluation 
for the careful study of processes, the strongly negative views of the urban Marxist scholars 
(Engels, Lefebvre and Harvey) have most strongly permeated contemporary accounts of 
Haussmann’s actions. It is only quite recently that a more nuanced reconsideration of the 
transformation of Paris has emerged, carried by studies of urban history in France, most notably 
Francois Loyer’s discussion of the surprising balance of the Haussmannian architectural system3, 
and Florence Bourillon’s detailed work on Parisian industrial quarters which tempers the usual 
association of the public works with worker displacement4. 
Given the focus of this paper on Haussmann’s use of planning law, it is necessary to engage with 
two diametrically opposed interpretations of Haussmann’s position in the public works. More 
critical accounts of the historical period have as their central assumption that Haussmann had full 
control over the city and could push through, relatively unhindered, Napoleon’s III ambitions5 for 
Paris. The three quotes below, by Engels, Geddes and Benjamin, illustrate this tendency for three 
interpretations given to this historical period – proto-gentrification6, authoritarian modernisation7 
and the consolidation of urban capitalism8 respectively: 
‘By ‘Haussmann’ I mean the practice which has now become general of making breaches in the 
working class quarters of our big towns.’9  
 
‘Town planning is not something which can be done from above, on general principles easily laid 
down, which can be learned in one place and imitated in another – that way Haussmannism lies.’10  
‘As for the phantasmagoria of civilization itself, it found its champion in Haussmann and its 
manifest expression in his transformations of Paris.’11  
 
This personification took its final form in the concept of haussmannisation, ‘used very loosely, to 
designate virtually every topographical alteration or social change that marked Paris during 
Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine.’12 This concept, or the condensate of the 17 years of 
public works, has been invoked in urban contexts as different as London13, Brussels14, Dakar15, 
Managua16 and Cairo17, but its central assumption that Haussmann was able to push through the 
emperor’s vision of the city relatively unhindered remains. This is an assumption that is best 
summarised by Chapman & Chapman for who ‘Haussmann could only have had the career he did 
under the Second Empire. And very few men indeed could have made what he did of the unique 
position he held. He was fortunate in that for seventeen years he was able to exercise his 
considerable talents to the full.’18  
This interpretation of the public works is diametrically opposed to work that details the difficulties 
Haussmann faced in trying to bring the emperor’s ambitions for the city to life: ‘it had to be 
developed into practical working plans and then transformed into the reality of stone and mortar 
over the almost insuperable obstacles of expense, vested property interests, the inertia of municipal 
authorities, and political hostility.’19 Similarly, Giedion points out that ‘there would have been no 
objections if he had confined himself to enlarging streets already in existence. But to cut new ones 
was to disturb the settled scheme of things and to show a lack of respect for the rights of 
property.’20 The accounts that foreground Haussmann’s planning power forget that property 
owners had become a ‘formidable competitor for control of urban space.’21 
These studies which question the image of Haussmann as an omnipotent planner also discuss a 
number of legislative defeats he suffered in the Council of State22, France’s supreme court of 
appeal for administrative law. The most direct consequence of these decisions was that 
expropriations became a source of enrichment for property owners, given that they were allowed to 
reap the value added to their properties by the municipal public works without having to contribute 
in any way23. Expropriations thus became a clear source of enrichment by the early 1860s: 
Halbwachs notes that before then, expropriations juries had not ‘distorted the public judgment of 
the right to property by attributing compensations that were without relation to the real value of the 
building.’24 This clearly made expropriations more expensive, a fact which pushed Haussmann into 
using the services of building companies in order to share with them the heightened costs of 
expropriations. As Hall informs us ‘from the end of the 1850s the regularization operations were 
being increasingly handed over to entrepreneurs, who became responsible for the entire process of 
implementation, including expropriations, and who supplied the town with finished streets.’25  
Can these two different accounts of the public works be reconciled? On the one hand are 
statements that Haussmann had the full backing from the Emperor and could pursue, relatively 
unhindered, the program he had set out for the city, and on the other are interpretations which take 
seriously the series of legislative defeats which fundamentally altered his mode of operation, 
forcing him to relinquish control over the public works to property owners and developers. 
 
Planning historian Benevolo provides an important starting point with his conception of planning 
as an activity that has two components, what he calls the technical and the political. Historically, 
there have been configurations in which these two dimensions have been fused, and some in which 
they have been separated. The line separating out these two periods is the 1848 revolution. Before 
that date, planning had been undertaken by specialists and officials but had kept close links to the 
activism of the utopians (Owen, Saint Simon, Fourier, Cabet and Godin) and thus, their 
‘achievements, even the most technical, had their roots firmly planted in matters of ideology, 
which in turn corresponded largely with the beginnings of modern socialism.’26 After that, 
however, politics and planning split, leaving planning as a technical activity ready to be captured 
by the regimes in place, what he calls the ‘new conservative ideology’. It is in this new context that 
‘Haussmann set the pattern for the town-planner as a specialist worker who declines all 
responsibility for initial choice, and therefore in practice for the town planner who is at the service 
of the new ruling class.’27  
 
It is therefore possible to reframe the question thus: if Haussmann was merely a technical planner, 
why did he face such strong opposition in the Council of State? To answer this question it is 
necessary to take a more detailed look at the daily decisions Haussmann took in the delivery of the 
Emperor’s ambitions for Paris. And given that the opposition Haussmann faced played out in the 
highest administrative court, such an investigation must centre on Haussmann’s use of planning 
law. As will be shown in the rest of the paper, Haussmann had a very strategic approach to the use 
of planning law, an observation that will be fleshed out by focusing on two types of planning 
interventions. In street widening procedures, Haussmann worked to strictly enforce a law that had 
become dead letter. And in street creation procedures, Haussmann fought against the strict 
application of planning law to protect the public works from speculation.  
 
A planning practice can thus be defined as the way in which the body of law is used to advance the 
goals of the planning apparatus. The empirical material discussed in this paper will make it clear 
that Haussmann’s planning practice faced considerable opposition. This is because it led to 
planning’s legal framework to once again become a site of contest. Indeed, it will be shown that in 
mid-19th century Paris, the legal framework for planning was firmly in the hands of property 
owners. They had the capacity to disregard planning law when it went against their interests and 
the ability to strictly enforce planning law when it advanced their cause. Haussmann’s planning 
practice, with its strategic use of the law, was able to lay bare the fact that planning law has no 
legitimacy in itself – it is particular uses of the law that can gain or lose legitimacy. 
 
Planning power can thus be defined as the possession of legitimacy in the use of planning law. 
Haussmann’s ability to recapture planning power from property owners will be shown to have 
depended on the backing of the Imperial Regime. But it will also be suggested that Haussmann’s 
early actions may have been seen as legitimate by the Parisian population because they were a 
practical response to the city’s concrete problems. After a quick methodological discussion, the 
paper has four main sections: a description of the body of planning law Haussmann encountered 
upon his arrival in Paris; a detailed presentation of his planning practice; an account of the way in 
which property owners defeated this practice; and a discussion of the implications of this battle for 
planning power. What emerges is a better appreciation of the complexities of the transformation of 
Paris. But this paper also highlights the importance of thinking through the implications of the 
mobility of planning power for the possibility of truly public interventions.  
1.2 HAUSSMANN IN THE ARCHIVES 
Haussmann was appointed Prefect of the Department of the Seine in June 1853. As prefect and sole 
executive authority over the department of the Seine, Haussmann’s attributions were vast. He 
cumulated the functions of Prefect of the Department and of Mayor of Paris and was thus in charge 
of appointing the agents of municipal services, deciding on alignments and building permits for all 
of Paris’ roads, establishing expropriations to be carried out, and in general presided over all 
aspects of the municipal administration. In spite of these vast attributions and of his special 
relationship with the Emperor, as prefect, Haussmann was still a civil servant of the Imperial 
regime and thus subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.  
 
The material discussed in the rest of the paper comes from the archives of the Departmental Affairs 
section of the Interior Ministry, to which Haussmann reported, and more specifically, from three 
boxes28 containing cases related to the urban road network in the Department of the Seine29 from 
1853 (Haussmann’s assumption of the role of Prefect of the Seine) to 185930 (just after his defeat in 
the Council of State). These boxes contain 115 administrative cases31 centred on letters or petitions 
sent to the Minister of the Interior (Haussmann’s immediate superior) by Parisians over the 1853 to 
1859 period, an example of which can be found in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A letter written to the Minister of the Interior in 1857 to bypass the refusal he had 
received from Haussmann. Source: author.  
 
 
These letters were sent to Haussmann’s superiors deliberately: most of them were complaints about 
his actions or attempts to bypass his authority. These three boxes thus reveal the issues Parisians 
(and mostly property owners) had with his planning practice32. What is important is that the cases 
do not only contain the letters of complaint: once the Ministry of the Interior received a letter or 
petition concerning Haussmann’s work, it had to be forwarded to Haussmann either to ask him 
about his view on the petition or to ask for his justification of the decision that was complained 
about. Most cases were resolved quite quickly and the paper trace that remains is usually the 
original letter and Haussmann’s reply to the Ministry of the Interior’s request for more information. 
Some more complex cases can contain multiple letters to the Ministry of the Interior over the 
period of a couple of years, Haussmann’s replies to the Minister’s request for information or for a 
justification and the Minister’s responses to these.  
 
Taken together, these cases thus offer written traces of the usually conflictive relations between 
Haussmann and property owners and, more importantly for the outcome of this opposition, 
indications of disagreements between Haussmann and the Interior Ministry. Before presenting what 
can be gleaned of Haussmann’s planning practice from these letters, it is necessary to introduce the 
planning context Haussmann inherited. 
2. PLANNING LAW BEFORE HAUSSMANN 
2.1 THE DEFEAT OF NAPOLEONIC PLANNING 
Passed under Napoleon I’s Empire, the 1807 law gave the planning authority strong tools to modify 
the urban fabric. It ‘empowered all towns to draw up plans showing the desired ‘alignements’ of all 
their streets and other public places, including those not yet in existence. After approval of the 
plans by the prefect of the department and the central government, the mayors were empowered to 
require all new building to conform to the ‘alignements’. Lands ceded to the highway in execution 
of the ‘alignements’ were to be compensated at their assessed value only, with no indemnity paid 
for disturbance. General powers of compulsory purchase were also clarified.’33 The word 
‘alignement’ has a particular meaning in this context: it refers to the layout of the street as it 
features in a general street plan of the area. A street that is outside its alignment is one that does not 
conform to the way in which it is laid out in the plan of the area. The 1807 law was thus meant to 
foster the incremental widening of streets by refusing to allow buildings to be erected or repaired if 
they overstepped the decreed alignment. But it also placed the powers of expropriation in the hands 
of the executive, not the judiciary: the administration had the mandate to decide on the works to be 
undertaken in the name of public utility, to pronounce the expropriations required and to decide on 
the compensations to be distributed. 
 
In practice, however, the 1807 law never received full application in terms of both its street 
widening and street creation (and expropriation) clauses. There seem to have been two main ways 
in which this occurred. First, the 1807 law came under attack in the legislature and the courts. The 
power to decide on expropriations was quickly handed back to the courts in 1810, where it resided 
until 1833. In that year, the power to decide on expropriations was given back to the administration 
but the right to pronounce expropriations stayed with the courts. This system was very 
cumbersome in practice, with very long administrative procedures and could be threatened by the 
refusal of a single property owner, problems faced by Prefect Rambuteau while piercing Paris’ first 
boulevard in 1838 (the street near the Pompidou Centre which still bears his name). With respect to 
expropriations then, the 1807 law quickly became dead letter. Because expropriations had been 
separated out from the general concept of alignment, they were now subject to the stringent 
requirements of the 1833 law (and of the 1841 law, a railroad building instrument) rather than 
treated as fixed lines on a general plan that property owners needed to yield to. 
 
Attacks by the courts on the 1807 law were also directed at its street widening clauses. Here, it 
seems as though the Civil Buildings’ Council (‘Conseil des Bâtiments Civils’), henceforth CBC, 
played a central role. The CBC was an institution that offered architectural guidance in the context 
of public building commissions and public works projects. In a 1858 letter to the Minister of the 
Interior, Haussmann indicts the CBC for contributing to the weakening of the 1807 law: ‘it is not 
the first time that the Civil Building’s Council’s opinion goes against measures decided by the 
administration to improve the road network based on a sound evaluation of the city’s needs. Its 
influence has contributed in no small measure to the creation of the narrow and petty case law 
which still holds sway in the Council of State today as concerns housing under legal order to be 
pulled back and that allows most of these houses to defy the 1807 law with impunity.’ In the same 
letter, Haussmann exposed the CBC’s historical links with private property, denouncing ‘the 
architects (most of them kept very busy by private construction projects) that make up the Civil 
Buildings Council and who bring to it mind-sets fore-warned against the actions of the municipal 
authority.’ 
 
But the courts and property owners and their allies in the CBC were not the only institutions that 
sought to limit the power of the 1807 law. A second way in which the 1807 law was not invoked to 
its full potential concerns its application in practice. Over and beyond the defeats it suffered in the 
courts and legislature, Roncayolo offers an indication that it was never applied very rigorously 
during the July Monarchy (1830-1848): ‘the figures of the property owner and of the tax payer 
(often the same person) inspire the utmost respect. Thus, one refrains from scrupulously 
implementing the measures of the 1807 law on alignments and city extensions, notably with 
respect to the drawing up of a general plan. One limits oneself, under the fastidious gaze of the 
architects of the Civil Building’s Council, to ensuring the smooth join at the limits of existing and 
new urban tissue.’34 Under the July Monarchy, a time of strong reaction against the centralising 
tendencies of the Empire and the Bourbon Restoration, it thus seems as though property owners 
could do with their properties as they pleased. Napeolonic planning and its manifestation in the 
1807 law had quickly been defeated by property owners and their architects – the planning power 
in 19th century Paris. 
2.2 THE CONTEXT FOR A PLANNING PRACTICE? 
It is only in 1850 – after the cholera epidemic of 1849 – that the focus returned to strong planning 
laws. The Second Republic (with Napoleon’s nephew as president) pushed through an efficient 
compulsory acquisition instrument. Its thirteenth article stated that the municipality may acquire all 
concerned properties through the 1841 law’s procedure if their insanitary condition is the result of 
external and permanent causes. As Benevolo notes: ‘the whole importance of the law lies in this 
article.’35 Insanitary conditions could thus serve as a pretext to put the 1841 law’s compulsory 
purchase procedure to use.  
 
Expropriation legislation was further strengthened by the 1852 decree, passed by Napoleon III 
(after his 1851 coup) only a year before Haussmann’s tenure as Prefect of the Seine. Its most 
important article is the following: ‘In all expropriation projects aimed at widening, straightening or 
creating Parisian streets, the Administration will have the possibility of including the totality of 
affected buildings in its plans, in those cases where it considers that remaining sections are not of a 
size or shape that would allow for salubrious constructions to be erected on them.’36 In other 
words, when a new street is to pierce through urban fabric, the sections of buildings through which 
the new street is to pass will be expropriated, but also all those sections of buildings that have been 
partially cut through and which are not deemed to be large enough to accommodate salubrious 
buildings.  
 
The 1852 decree thus reinforced the tools at planners’ disposal by allowing for the expropriation 
not only of the required buildings themselves but also of strips of land that bordered the future path 
of the boulevard. This allowed for the capture by the city of real estate that would immensely 
increase in value after the boulevard was pierced and that could then be sold off at a high margin. 
The huge expenditures needed to expropriate, demolish, clear, level, pave, etc., could then be 
recouped by selling the land bordering the new boulevards.  
 
This clause of the 1852 law thus strengthened the hand of the municipal administration but the 
lengthy administrative procedures that had been accumulated through the trials and errors of the 
expropriation legislation since 1807 still remained. In addition, for all the changes introduced to the 
expropriation legislation by both the 1850 and 1852 laws, they did not strengthen the 1807 law as 
concerns the issue of alignments, understood here as the need to draw up general plans and limit 
repairs and new constructions that did not conform with them. By themselves, these new laws did 
not challenge the prevailing planning power. But they did set the context for Haussmann to 
creatively fashion his planning practice. 
3. HAUSSMANN’S PLANNING PRACTICE 
It is now possible to turn to the archival material to flesh out Haussmann’s short-lived planning 
practice. Two main types of administrative decisions were the focus of most of the property 
owners’ complaints: refusals of any repairs, minor constructions or property development because 
the building in question was not on the proper street alignment or because a new street was to be 
opened up over the property. These will be discussed in turn, with a focus on the way in which 
Haussmann used the legal framework he inherited.  
3.1 STREET WIDENING IN PRACTICE 
Following a refusal from the municipal authority to authorise the repair or renovation of a property 
that was not on the proper alignment, property owners wrote to the Minister of the Interior to ask 
him to revoke this decision, usually because they did not think that the repair works would lead to a 
strengthening of the building. The issue of whether repairs or renovations would strengthen a 
property that sat outside of the alignment was important because it determined the effectiveness of 
the gradual approach to urban change street widening represented. The stricter the municipal 
authority was on the kinds of repairs that should be considered as reinforcing a property, the more 
quickly the state of the properties would deteriorate and the more quickly the property owners 
would have to destroy or pull back their properties. On the other hand, if (as during the July 
Monarchy) property owners were allowed to reinforce their properties or mask the extent of their 
state of disrepair, they could perpetuate the existence of a property outside of the proper alignment. 
This issue is well illustrated by the two letters below: a property owner’s complaint to the Minister 
of the Interior on the 12th of February 1854 and Haussmann’s response to the Minister’s inquiry 
about this letter, from the 28th of April of the same year. Here is the property owner’s letter: 
 
‘Mr Minister, a prefectural decree from the 26th of January refused to authorise me to renovate 
parts of the right gable of a house at 4 rue Saint Christophe in Paris of which I am the owner. I take 
the liberty to appeal to your Excellency about this decision. The refusal I was notified of is based 
on the bad state of the wall I am not allowed to renovate: but a careful examination will easily 
make noticeable, I have no doubt about this, that this wall is not in the state of disrepair and 
damage reported by the ‘Bureau de Consultation de la Grande Voirie’ [Highway Consultation 
Council], that it is, quite to the contrary, in conditions of solidity that guarantee its life for a long 
time still and that finally the fears that its exposed construction may have elicited are in reality 
without any basis. Such is the conscientious and oft repeated opinion of several architects and I do 
not hesitate, Mr Minister, to vouch on my honour for these facts. Another consideration is worth 
submitting to your Excellency’s kind attention: owner of a house at 18 rue d’Arcole, I purchased 
the one at 4 rue Saint Christophe that leans against it only with the view of joining it to the first and 
to make the one the essential complement, in a way, of the other. This project has never ceased to 
be mine, but adverse events have until now prevented its fulfilment: at the moment I am about to 
go through with it, the obligation to destroy a significant portion of one of these houses would be 
extremely painful to me, all the while greatly harming me materially, as it would take away from 
me, without any possible compensation, a part of what constitutes my assets, more than modest, 
and would mean losing all of the rewards of the sacrifice I have forced unto myself. Allow me, Mr 
Minister, to trust in your Excellency’s equity, and to ask you, in this occasion, to accept the 
homage of my highest consideration and respectful devotion. Signed: Baron Martineau.’  
 
And here is Haussmann’s response to the Minister’s request for his opinion on the case: 
 
‘Here is, Mr Minister, the cause of this refusal. According to the general plan of alignments for the 
rue Saint Christophe authorised on the 13th of Ventose year VII (March 3rd 1799), the 
aforementioned house is liable to be pulled back by about 2.6 meters. The road surveyors having 
recognised that the portion of the shared wall that exceeds the aligned house to its right is in a bad 
state, criss-crossed vertically by two large cracks and built with major and filling stones that are 
degraded and disjoined; that the two bottom layers of the main pillar joining the two houses were 
destroyed 10 centimetres deep and that the projected works would have had the effect of 
consolidating that wall; I thought I needed to forbid all manner of repairs. Mr Baron Martineau 
presents, in support of his complaint that his gable wall is not in the state of degradation and 
deterioration that the agents of my Administration have pointed out, that it is in conditions of 
solidity that guarantee its life for a long time still, and that finally the fears that this wall may have 
elicited are in fact without foundation, and are not shared by several architects he consulted. He 
ends by looking to put forward motives of a private interest of which I have no need to judge the 
value. I have had this case examined again and the agents of my Administration have recognised, 
as they had the first time around that the gable wall of Mr Martineau’s wall is in a very bad state. I 
think I need to add here that in 1847 already this wall was filled in and full of cracks, and that this 
situation has only worsened, to the point that the Police Prefect has ordered its demolition for 
safety reasons. In consequence, I can only persist in the reasons underlying my refusal, and I have 
the honour of proposing that you reject Mr Martineau’s complaint.’ 
 
The repairs that Baron Martineau needed to execute to comply with the Police Prefect’s injunction 
could only be done on the proper alignment and this was thus a perfect opportunity for Haussmann 
to bring a refractory building back to the decreed alignment. The fact that Haussmann invoked an 
alignment plan that precedes the 1807 law shows that he had taken on the task of making sure that 
alignments were properly enforced, regardless of how long they had been ignored. In the case of 
street widening procedures, Haussmann thus pushed for the strict application of a law that had 
become dead letter. It will be made clear below that Haussmann’s relation to the law was very 
different in street creation cases. 
3.2 STREET CREATION IN PRACTICE 
As mentioned above, the 1852 law gave the executive the power to decree expropriations but the 
separation of the concept of expropriation from that of alignment after the 1807 law meant that the 
lengthy administrative procedure of the 1841 law remained. There were a number of administrative 
steps that needed to be taken between the moment when the public became aware of expropriation 
plans for their neighbourhood and the moment at which the expropriation of their particular 
property would be consumed. During this time, Haussmann thought property owners in the zone to 
be expropriated should be forbidden from making any changes to their properties, even if they were 
on the proper alignment. That this should not be the case was inconceivable for him, as he explains 
in an 1857 letter to the Interior Minister:  
 
‘The administration should, without taking any account of its projects and without making a single 
comment, provide all construction permits requested by individuals within the limits of the old 
alignments, even as an administrative procedure is under way to adopt new plans. Until the decree 
declaring expropriations of public utility, everyone should be completely free to take all possible 
actions to block its subsequent execution; the administration alone would have its hands tied. In 
this system, the inevitable administrative delays would be a time reserved for private interests, 
always very apt and very active, to speculate on the projects submitted to the public enquiries, and 
commit all possible frauds against general and municipal interests. It would be the moment, or 
never, to invoke the maxim: summum jus, summa injuria.’ 
 
This led Haussmann to apply the principle that no building or rebuilding could take place on a 
property outside of a new alignment to street creations and he thus forbade any repair, construction 
or property development that could be seen as adding value to a property that was to be 
expropriated for public utility works, however far in the administrative process these had gotten to. 
This was the case from simple projects decided with the Emperor to expropriations just about to be 
officially decreed: once the plan had been decided, it was illegal to build or rebuild on the wrong 
alignment. In effect, Haussmann was applying, and even strengthening, the 1807 law whose street 
creation clauses had been severely defeated by property owners. He explained this conception of 
street creation to the Minister in his 1857 letter: 
 
‘The refusal I notified Mr. Bergeront of the authorisation to erect new buildings on the rue de 
Longchamps does not cause him any noticeable harm. Finally, there is a real analogy here between 
his situation and that of a property owner subject to a normal alignment procedure who can neither 
repair nor improve his building, but who continues to make the most out of it in the state in which 
it finds itself and who cannot take advantage of speculations he is forbidden to undertake to claim 
compensation. In any case, the municipal administration, whose right and duty it is to implement 
all improvements to the city’s old plans that are called for by the new needs of traffic and 
circulation, would be paralysed in its action if, in the presence of project well established in the 
sovereign’s will, but not yet decreed, it could be forced to authorise constructions that would come 
to obstruct them. […] The application of these principles has been made by you, Mr Minister, in 
numerous occasions, notably in the Radiguet case (December 1st 1855). I have the honour of 
calling the serious attention of your Excellency on this case, the solution of which could have a 
great influence on the future of street network measures.’ 
 
Haussmann’s interpretation of the law can be confronted to that of a property owner in his 1856 
letter to the Minister of the Interior: 
 
‘The 1807 law had confused two cases, which are nonetheless very different, one that is concerned 
with widening, of correcting an existing street, and that concerned with the opening of a new street, 
a new communication axis. In both cases, one proceeded through alignments; and one then 
confused the alignment and the expropriation jurisprudences. The March 1810 law quickly came to 
put an end to this confusion; nonetheless, the Administration has still sometimes wanted to invoke 
the right to subject properties that new streets would traverse to alignment, i.e. the refusal to build 
or repair, when financial resources did not allow it to proceed through expropriation. But the 1833 
and 1841 laws have come to cease what amounted to a veritable despoliation, and settle this issue 
with principles that are now indisputable. The mistake of Mr Prefect of the Seine is to want to 
apply today, once more, a case law that can no longer be used: this error is not allowed, this 
doctrine can no longer be questioned.’ 
 
In effect, Haussmann was bracketing out over 40 years of court proceedings and was applying the 
1807 law as it was meant to be used, and more, by including not just plans officially decreed but 
also any project that had been decided by his administration. The fact that Haussmann persisted in 
using the 1807 law to forbid property owners to build or repair their property if it was on the path 
of a street that was to be created explains why street creations were by far the most contentious 
aspect of Haussmann’s planning practice. 
4. A BATTLE FOR PLANNING POWER 
4.1 PROPERTY OWNER RESISTANCE 
Faced with a planning practice that contested their power over planning, property owners quickly 
had to adapt. In street widening cases, the response was to call on the Minister of the Interior. For 
example, in the letter quoted above, Baron Martineau gives as much space in his letter to a 
refutation of the road surveyors’ statement as he does to the explanation of the project this house 
was to play a part in. But the project is in no way an argument that can be seriously invoked to 
refute the municipal administration’s decision, as Haussmann is very quick to point out. In general, 
property owners did not contest the legal basis of alignments but attempted to escape the 
application of the law by calling on the Minister of the Interior. This was the only possible 
response to the surprise of seeing the municipal administration taking the ignored 1807 law 
seriously. Property owners seem to have taken the laxity in the application of planning regulations 
under the July Monarchy as the confirmation of what they believed was a well-founded right to do 
as they pleased with their properties. This can be seen in the following 1854 letter of a property 
owner to the Interior Minister: 
 
‘Owner of a house in Paris at 92 boulevard de l’Hôpital (in between the rue du Marché aux 
Chevaux and the market itself), I asked Mr Prefect of the Seine the authorisation to repair its 
northern angle and to redo the exterior plastering degraded for a meter by the leaking of a gutter – 
this building is under an order to be pulled back by about a meter. In his 7 January 1854 decree, Mr 
Prefect of the Seine has refused, ‘considering that the house’s facade wall is strongly cracked in its 
portion that exceeds the house on its right; that this portion of it is completely detached from the 
facade of the house on its left, that several stones are broken in its lower portion, that the planned 
repair work would result in the wall being strengthened and, consequently, in delaying the 
widening of the street that fronts the property’. Despite these reasons, of which the terms are a little 
forced as concerns the consequences of the crack that I myself widened with a view to repair works 
I was not expecting to see refused, I have the honour of seeking from Your Excellency the same 
authorisation, asking you to extend it to the repair of two meters of the entablature degraded by the 
leaking of the same gutter and situated just above the reported plaster degradations.’ 
 
This property owner brushed away the municipal administration’s refusal and turned directly to the 
Minister of the Interior for the same authorisation, and more. In attempting to enforce the 1807 law 
rigorously, Haussmann was confronted with the inertia of a planning regime in which infractions 
were not prosecuted. It is in this space that the CBC must have operated to disqualify Haussmann’s 
attempts at the regularisation of the urban fabric. 
 
In street creation cases, it is clear that after 1856 most property owners had come to realise that 
Haussmann was using his own interpretation of the regulations at his disposal, and that this 
improper use could be attacked more forcefully in their letters to the Minister. Haussmann’s 
conflation of alignments and expropriations was something property owners deeply opposed, as 
this 1856 letter to the Interior Minister makes clear: 
 
‘There is first a profound difference between the alignment of existing public streets and the 
creation, the opening of new streets. With respect to existing streets, public utility is, in a manner 
of speaking, declared, and the alignment decision produces immediate effects [...] we must 
recognise that in all cases, he can no longer build on the plot included in the alignment.[...] The 
opening of new streets accompanies public utility works, for the execution of which the law has 
consecrated and organised the possibility of expropriating, by imposing on individuals the sacrifice 
of their right to private property, in exchange for a prior compensation.’ 
 
For property owners, the loss of their property through expropriation was a ‘sacrifice’ and they 
thought they were thus justified in attempting to profit as much as possible from this loss. 
Administrative hurdles were thus seen as a healthy safeguard against the excessive power 
expropriation law afforded the public authorities, all the more when they allowed for opportunities 
to increase the compensation one would eventually receive. A further quote taken from Mr 
Bergeront’s 1856 letter to the Minister of the Interior gives a good indication of the way in which 
property owners viewed Haussmann’s actions: 
 
‘Against these tendencies, legal action would be a powerless remedy. Everything depends on the 
Administration itself, on the spirit that moves it, on the thought it obeys. We have full trust in the 
judgement and wisdom of the authorities, whose scrupulous observance of the principles and laws 
has always been the supreme rule, and who will know, we have no doubt, how to prevent the 
emergence of these dangers we have brought to their attention.’ 
 What the quote above suggests is that this dispute was as much about financial issues as it was 
about the existence of a strong and independent planning practice at the municipal level. This 
property owner is asking the Minister to uphold the laws that govern expropriations because they 
allowed property owners some independence from the public authority: they were free to repair, 
improve or build while waiting for their expropriation, and thus free to speculate on the public 
works to increase the compensation they were to receive. Mr Bergeront’s complaint about the 
powerlessness of legal action can thus be seen as a reaction to a phenomenon he felt property 
owners no longer had any hold on. It is quite clear that he did not want everything to depend on the 
‘spirit’ that moves the Administration or on the ‘thought’ it obeys. What property owners such as 
Mr Bergeront wanted to avoid was precisely an autonomous planning practice at the municipal 
level without much regard for the rights of private property. It is in this context that the multiple 
legal proceedings that brought down Haussmann’s planning practice were initiated. 
4.2 THE DEFEAT OF A PLANNING PRACTICE 
Given that Haussmann’s planning practice was built on a strategic (and at times creative) 
reappropriation of planning law, it is clear that the courts would be the preferred outlet for property 
owner frustration. And the letters reveal very close links between the property owners most 
virulent in their attacks on Haussmann and the judicial bodies, and especially the Council of State 
and the Court of Cassation. Many property owners hired lawyers to defend their interests in the 
Council of State (as mentioned in the letter in Figure 2), and in a number of cases it is the lawyers 
themselves who wrote to Haussmann. These are the letters in which Haussmann’s planning 
practice came under the most intense legal scrutiny. Gaillard notes that very close links existed 
between property owners and the judicial bodies because magistrates were themselves property 
owners but also because these courts offered property owners protection, given that they 
represented ‘traditional legislation favourable to individual property ownership’37. But court 
proceedings could not achieve much if Haussmann had the personal backing of the emperor. This 
support must thus have been lost by Haussmann at some point in the late 1850s. The strength of 
Napoleon III’s support can most effectively be read through the relation between Haussmann and 
the Interior Minister.  
 
And while there were many such Ministers during Haussmann’s tenure, there was a notable change 
in attitude towards Haussmann’s planning practice over the years. This change occurred during the 
time Adolphe Billault was Minister of the Interior, between 1854 and 1858. It seems as though 
Billault’s major concern during that period was to ensure that election results were favourable to 
the Empire, and especially at the legislative elections of 1857. And while successful at the national 
level, the fact that the only five opposition candidates elected took half of 10 Parisian seats must 
have been a source of worry. This was a period in which the Emperor was trying to display his 
popular support, a support that had elected him President of the Second Republic in 1849 but 
which he had mostly lost with his 1851 coup d’état. 
 
This is directly reflected in the exchanges between Haussmann and the Ministers: while Persigny, 
whose tenure ended in 1854, and Billault until 1856 raised only occasional objections to 
Haussmann’s planning practice, from 1856 onwards Billault and his successors Espinasse and 
Casanova started to side quite forcefully with property owners (and the Civil Buildings’ Council) 
against Haussmann. While their arguments remained focused on the defence of property rights, 
their concern was much more with matters of national interest, that is, with securing property 
owners as supporters of Napoleon III’s regime. What Interior Minister Billault and his successors 
must have sensed was that Haussmann’s hard-line stance against property owners was pushing 
these away from the regime into republican arms: ‘A material foundation was laid for a political 
rapprochement between Parisian property owners and Empire. Unbeholden at the beginning, the 
Empire increasingly looked to them as a base of support in a capital where opposition sentiment 
dominated as early as 1857.’38 
 The survival of the imperial regime seems to have become a more pressing concern than planning 
power. The following case is a good illustration of this. The owner of a large apartment building in 
the 8th Arrondissement wrote to the Minister of the Interior in 1856 because she had been refused 
the authorisation she had requested to repair her facade on grounds that her property had to be 
pulled back 25 centimetres from the street. She argued that such a small gain to the width of the 
street was useless, as well as the following: ‘As this house is occupied as of July by twenty small 
households, getting rid of these apartments at a time when small lodgings are this rare, especially in 
this neighbourhood, is to go directly against the government’s stated goal of encouraging new 
constructions of this kind.’  
 
As detailed in his letter in Figure 3, for Haussmann, this is a property owner who is driven by 
private interest only, given that the idea is to join this house to her residence in two years’ time 
when the tenancies have run out. As the house is in such a state of disrepair, it cannot be allowed to 
persist any longer. He recommends the Minister not to heed the property owner’s request, given 
that the house ‘has arrived at the end of its time; now, its reconstruction being mandatory, whatever 
the extent of the retrenchment, the administration cannot authorise, even temporarily, repairs that to 
be actually effective, would not only consist in a partial renovation but also in the rebuilding of the 
main columns, piers, etc. It would establish a precedent all the more regrettable that in almost all 
neighbourhoods the grounds Mrs de Montgomery put forward could be evoked.’ 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A letter written by Haussmann to the Minister of the Interior in 1856. Source: author. 
 
 
The Ministry of the Interior did not follow Haussmann’s recommendation, but for reasons very far 
removed from the planning oppositions discussed here: ‘In the strict legal sense, the Prefecture of 
the Seine is right. However, as the permission is requested only as toleration, for 18 months only, 
and the house it concerns containing 20 worker lodgings, it seems to me that a refusal would be too 
rigorous and even impolitic in the current crisis of the rarity and dearness of small lodgings.’  
 
The key word here is ‘impolitic’: the Minister of the Interior thus decided on Haussmann’s 
planning practice based on external political considerations. He wanted to keep both the property 
owner and the tenants as supporters of the imperial regime. Haussmann was becoming a liability to 
this regime and his close relationship with the emperor could no longer uphold his planning 
practice. In the cases that followed, Haussmann continued to call on the authority of Napoleon III, 
such as in this 1857 letter: ‘Your administration, Mr Minister, wants the same thing as mine: to 
safeguard the execution of the plans decided by the Emperor.’ But this was no longer productive, 
as this 1858 letter from the Interior Minister to Haussmann makes clear:  
 
‘As I have already mentioned to you several times, Mr Prefect, such grounds are not acceptable. It 
is impossible to refuse this individual the authorisation to build on the present alignment on the 
grounds that there are discussions to establish a new one. In addition, the decree you asked for, and 
which is currently under examination in the Council of State, does not impose any servitudes 
forbidding repairs on the property of Mr Coqueret. It only authorises you to acquire it amicably, or 
through expropriation. As long as you do not make use of that authorisation, you cannot oppose the 
repairs he is planning on undertaking. Following these explanations, I have concluded, Mr Prefect, 
with the General Council of Civil Buildings, that Mr Coqueret’s petition must be accepted, and I 
invite you to deliver him the permission he requests.’ 
 
The Minister’s intervention in planning debates sealed the end of the possibilities opened up for a 
truly autonomous planning apparatus by Haussmann. The loss of protection from the Emperor 
meant that the court cases in the Council of State from property owners and the direct line of the 
CBC to the Minister of the Interior could easily bring down Haussmann’s planning practice. As 
Roncayolo notes, following the defeats in the courts, ‘initial possession of land is worth speculative 
profits, while the law of 1807 and the sharing of value-added it imposed are brought back to 
memory less and less often.’39 It is clear that this was an effective strategy to secure property 
owners as supporters of the regime – it meant that planning power had returned to the hands of 
property owners.  
5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING POWER 
Property owners and their allies in the CBC and the courts had defeated Napoleonic planning and 
were ready to brush aside the nephew’s envoy. What they did not expect was that Haussmann 
would reopen the legal framework as a site of contest by making use of legal possibilities they 
thought they had effectively curtailed. Planning power was once again available to be claimed. And 
Haussmann was quick to exploit this newly gained planning power.  
 
In street widening cases, Haussmann had a legal basis on which to draw but had to re-establish its 
authority. His efforts thus centred on creating a structure that could effectively scrutinise property 
owner actions to make sure that buildings refractory to the alignment could not be consolidated. 
Complaints could then be deflected by referring to planning law. In street creation cases, he 
decided to take the law into his own hands to limit the extent to which property owners could 
speculate on the municipal public works. Without a clear legal basis, Haussmann resorted to 
Napoleonic ideas of the pre-eminence of the state over private interests.  
 
Viewing Haussmann’s actions as a strategically devised planning practice allows for an assessment 
of the contradiction highlighted in the introduction. Haussmann clearly had autonomy: the planning 
practice is his own and he had to constantly defend it in the face of property owner attacks. But 
Haussmann was also limited in his autonomy: a crucial variable here is Napoleon III’s backing. It 
is this political support which opened the space in which he could craft his planning practice. It is 
no surprise that the two short moments in 19th century France where state intervention was given a 
strong legal basis were Napoleonic. A genuinely autonomous planning practice thus only seems 
possible in certain singular periods in which the political will exists to supersede private interests40. 
It is this political will to placate private interests that gave legitimacy to Haussmann’s extra-legal 
planning practice. 
 
This interpretation of the relation between planning and private interests is in sharp contrast to that 
of Benevolo, who concludes his history of the European city with this statement: ‘The quality of 
urban space depends upon a fluctuating balance between spontaneity and regularity, and upon a 
combination of public control and private initiative that can either succeed or fail, stimulate 
creative change or paralyse it.’41 To achieve this balance, he seems to recommend ‘public 
intervention at those moments when the urban fabric undergoes change, while giving free rein to 
private initiative in the intervening periods.’42 
 
But the material presented here has made it clear that there is an important distinction between 
public intervention and public control: while public intervention took place over the whole period 
of Haussmann’s tenure in the form of the public works (street and park creations, infrastructure 
projects, monuments, etc.), public control in the sense of the regulation of private activity was lost 
with Haussmann’s defeats in the Council of State. The crucial variable Benevolo does not consider 
is that the position of planning power is not fixed, that it can be captured by different segments of 
society. In 19th century Paris, the holders of planning power were property owners and the 
architects and lawyers that served their interests. In that context, there could be no autonomous 
public intervention unless planning power was recaptured from these private interests. 
 
And since the legal framework is a site of contest rather than a source of legitimacy, this recapture 
could only be achieved if its legitimacy was external to this field. The backing of the Imperial 
Regime was key here, but there is also a sense that Haussmann’s early actions may have been seen 
as legitimate by the Parisian population because they were a practical response to the concrete 
problems of overcrowding and public health risks. This is a point made by Choay who edited the 
Mémoires that Haussmann wrote towards the end of his life: ‘Haussmann’s thinking is not carried 
out in the abstract, but is concerned with specific case, that of Paris which is to be adapted to the 
requirements of the new era.’43 And, for her, this adaptation centred on ‘the will to optimise the 
city’s functioning by the integration of the ends and of the means put at his disposal by science and 
technology.’44 
 
More research is needed on this early period of Haussmann’s tenure (until his defeats in the 
Council of State which made it necessary for him to accommodate private interests) as the 
literature does not reveal any traces of popular discontent in the early years of this vast 
transformation of the inner city45. It must be possible to find some traces of the views of ordinary 
Parisians on the public works in the endless boxes of archives that remain to be explored.  
6. CONCLUSION 
While the material discussed in this paper may be insignificant in relation to the volume of reports, 
correspondence and bureaucratic paper trail generated during the 17 years of Haussmann’s tenure 
as Prefect, it nonetheless sheds light on an understudied episode in the history of urban planning.  
 
While the public works that transformed Paris are usually seen as a direct application of Napoleon 
III’s vision for the city, this paper revealed the distance that separated these abstract ambitions 
from the contested terrain of planning in Paris. To execute these ambitions with the means 
available to him, Haussmann had to forge a planning practice and wrest back planning power from 
property owners. This planning practice, which aimed to ensure property owners contributed 
meaningfully through limitations on their private property rights, had to be abandoned when it 
became too dangerous for the Empire. And while Haussmann pushed on with the public works, 
these became a source of speculative profit for property owners and developers.  
 
This episode makes it clear that planning law cannot be evaluated outside of a consideration of 
planning power: the legal framework in which planning is conducted is too easily captured by 
private interests, a situation which renders any public intervention only a means for further private 
gain. Effective public interventions thus first require the recapture of planning power based on the 
strategic reappropriation of planning law, even if this sometimes entails ‘creative law-making’. The 
crucial variable is the source of the external legitimacy which supports planning power. In the 
Haussmann case, it is clear that state support was central, even though early (implicit) population 
support cannot be ruled out until more research has been conducted.  
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